THE SAFETY NET: ITS DEFINITION, COSTS, AND BENEFITS
Walter and Weinberg defined the federal financial safety net as consisting of all explicit or implicit government guarantees of private financial liabilities. Private financial liabilities are those owed by one private market participant to another. As used by Walter and Weinberg, the phrase government guarantee means a federal government commitment to protect lenders from losses due to a borrower's default (Walter and Weinberg 2002) . 1 Following this definition, we include in our estimate of the safety net, insured bank and thrift deposits, certain other banking company liabilities, some government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) liabilities, selected private employer pension liabilities, as well as a subset of the liabilities of other financial firms. The details of why we chose to include these liabilities are provided below.
Effect of a Safety Net on Economic Efficiency
Government actions in the form of subsidies, taxes, or regulations change market outcomes, and in competitive markets such changes distort allocations and can reduce economic efficiency. Does the financial safety net cause distortions? As discussed in Walter and Weinberg, in principle, the government could design guarantees that mimic market outcomes. Typically, however, government intervention arises from a desire to alter market outcomes. In the case of guarantees, this means either expanding coverage or underpricing relative to private market guarantees. Underpricing means that the guarantor collects fees that are less than the expected value of its obligations. This underpricing subsidizes risk taking.
Underpriced guarantees tend to shift resources away from activities that are not covered toward those that are. In that way, a government guarantee is similar to a direct subsidy paid to those engaged in a particular activity. A guarantee is different, however, in the way it affects attitudes toward risk. By assigning to the government part of the risk in the activities being financed, the safety net reduces market participants' willingness to control risk. Overprovision of guarantees, while not necessarily drawing resources into an activity, does shift risk preferences in a way similar to underpricing. In short, guarantees lead to expanded risk taking.
Our calculation of the size of the safety net does not represent a measure of the size of the distortions to the allocation of resources and risk taking. Such a measure would require knowledge of the extent of underpricing or overprovision of government guarantees. Those would be difficult to measure, especially the latter, since government provision often preempts private market activity. We nevertheless believe that the extent of distortions is directly related to the size of the safety net. Other things being equal, the greater the share of private liabilities protected by the government safety net, the more likely it is that government guarantees are extending beyond the level of protection that would be provided in a private market.
Why Have a Safety Net?
If the safety net is distortionary, why have one? Proponents of the financial safety net, especially as it applies to banks, often argue that private risksharing arrangements tend to disregard the systemic consequences of large losses borne by an individual or a small group of institutions. The idea here is that such losses might spill over and generate further losses caused, for example, by a contagious loss of investor confidence. Under such a view, govern-ment protection for certain investors could prevent widespread financial panic or distress. While the potential systemic consequences of a large financial failure are difficult to assess, when faced with the possibility of widespread failures of financial firms, policymakers are likely to conclude that preventing such failures by protecting creditors of financial firms (providing safety net protection) is prudent.
Similarly, some observers maintain that the safety net protections can lower the costs of, and therefore encourage, certain highly beneficial financial arrangements. For example, Diamond and Dybvig (1983) argue that banks' performance of the maturity transformation function is highly beneficial to the economy but is more costly without government-provided deposit insurance. Banks perform maturity transformation by gathering money from numerous short-term depositors (those bank customers whose deposits mature soon after deposited-especially checking deposits, which are available, meaning that they mature, immediately after being deposited) to fund long-term loans to businesses and individuals. Without deposit insurance, which only the government has sufficient resources to provide, bank runs are likely to occur. A bank run happens when many depositors attempt to withdraw their funds simultaneously. Since banks make long-term loans, they cannot recover sufficient money from borrowers to meet a run and, therefore, fail. To protect themselves from runs, banks can undertake costly private measures, but Diamond and Dybvig argue that government deposit insurance is likely to be less expensive and therefore preferable to such measures.
LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY CHANGES THAT EXPANDED THE SAFETY NET
As shown in How did Walter and Weinberg determine which institutions to include as having an implicit guarantee and which liabilities issued by these institutions might be covered? As the authors noted, the critical question is whether market participants believe that a given institution will be protected, even though official policy may not state explicitly that all of these liabilities are protected. As of 1999, Walter and Weinberg argued that market participants were likely to assume that certain holders of liabilities in the largest 21 banking companies and the two largest thrift companies would be protected in the event that these firms became troubled. These 21 banking companies and two thrifts all had assets (in 1999 dollars) of more than $50 billion, which was greater than the smallest of the 11 institutions identified by the Comptroller of the Currency in 1984 as potentially too big to fail (Walter and Weinberg 2002, p. 381) . The liabilities that Walter and Weinberg assumed the market would be highly likely to view as protected were deposits of more than $100,000 (deposits of less than $100,000 are included in the "Explicitly Guaranteed Liabilities" column in the tables), federal funds loans made to the 21 banks and two thrifts, and repo transactions with these banks and thrifts. Though we intend to use a similar methodology for estimating the size of implicit guarantees for banking companies in 2009, events during the recent financial crisis required some adjustments.
Support for Stress-Tested Financial Companies
Given that the government had responded aggressively to problems in financial firms during the financial turmoil of 2008-2009, our challenge is to decide which institutions have implicit guarantees. Here we maintain that market participants were very likely to assume that the liabilities of the financial firms that were stress tested early in 2009 (participants in the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program-SCAP) had a strong likelihood of receiving federal backing if they suffered financial distress. Indeed, the announcement of the stress tests in February 2009 came with a promise of government-provided capital for stress-tested institutions that were shown to be in need of additional capital:
Under [the Treasury's Capital Assistance Program] CAP, federal banking supervisors will conduct forward-looking assessments [SCAP stress tests] to evaluate the capital needs of the major U.S. banking institutions under a more challenging economic environment. Should that assessment indicate that an additional capital buffer is warranted, banks will have an opportunity to turn first to private sources of capital. In light of the current challenging market environment, the Treasury is making government capital available immediately through the CAP to eligible banking institutions to provide this buffer. (FinancialStability.gov 2009) Additionally, a number of these firms did, in fact, receive government aid in the form of capital injections in 2008 and early 2009 through the Treasury's Capital Purchase Program or in response to the stress tests (FinancialStability.gov 2010, pp. 21, 27, 67-80) . This aid, both the aid promised under the CAP and aid received through the Capital Purchase Program, reduced the likelihood that all liabilityholders of the protected firms would suffer losses, so here we include all liabilities of the stress-tested banking institutions in our safety net calculation.
While some observers in 2009 may have viewed the likely passage of financial reform legislation as diminishing federal backing, we nevertheless count the liabilities of the stress-tested firms. Legislation that was intended to limit the chance that financial institutions would receive federal aid was being considered in the U.S. Congress during 2009. If market participants were convinced that such legislation would forestall any opportunity for the creditors of the largest financial institutions to be protected by the federal government, then our calculation might appropriately exclude the liabilities of stress-tested banking institutions. In fact, most of the legislative proposals included language that called for the closure of troubled financial firms with losses to equityholders and at least some creditors (though at least one leading proposal contained protections for creditors of financial firms if the failure of such a firm might create a systemic risk).
3 Nevertheless, legislative proposals contained provisions meant to establish a mechanism that could clearly identify "systemically important" financial firms. Such mechanisms seem likely to encourage market participant expectations of federal aid to the creditors of the largest (i.e., systemically important) firms. Given the ambiguous effect of the reform proposals on the probability of federal aid to the largest banking firms, and the clear protections provided for troubled firms and for their creditors during the financial turmoil, we retain their liabilities in our estimate of liabilities protected by the safety net, in keeping with Walter and Weinberg (2002) . (In a later section we remove the liabilities of stress-tested institutions and re-estimate the size of the safety net-see Table 2.) As indicated earlier, the total liabilities of the 19 stress-tested bank holding companies, less their liabilities that were explicitly covered by deposit insurance, summed to $7.3 trillion ("Implicitly Guaranteed Liabilities" column in the tables). This sum equals about 45 percent of all banking and savings firm liabilities.
Increased Ceiling on Insured Deposits
Several Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) programs expanded the explicit portion of the safety net for banks and thrifts ("Explicitly Guaranteed Liabilities" column in the tables) beyond the long-standing $100,000 coverage for deposits (which are also included in the "Explicitly Guaranteed Liabilities" column in the tables). 
OTHER COMPONENTS OF THE SAFETY NET
As in 1999, we include for 2009 the liabilities of government-sponsored enterprises (direct GSE liabilities plus the dollar amount of mortgage-backed security guarantees) in the "Implicitly Guaranteed Liabilities" column in the tables. Earlier we noted that government guarantees can often modify market prices. Though our article has made no attempt to measure the size of guarantees' effect on market prices, in the case of the GSEs' implicit guarantee, the size of the effect on market prices has been estimated by Passmore (2005) and others. 6 Passmore (2005) estimates that the average homeowner saved between 3 and 11 basis points on his or her mortgage because of the implicit guarantee. The subsidy lowers the GSEs' borrowing costs, and some of this saved borrowing cost is passed on to homeowners by the GSE in the form of lowered mortgage interest rates. Passmore calculates that about half of the guarantee's benefit flows to the shareholders of the GSEs. While the Treasury made clear its support for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac once these two financial firms were placed in conservatorship in September 2008, the support was not as strongly stated as that given to insured deposits, so we leave these liabilities in the implicit column in the tables. We also count all of the liabilities of American International Group (AIG) as implicitly guaranteed in the "Other Financial Firms" row in the tables. 
ALTERNATIVE ESTIMATES OF THE SIZE OF THE SAFETY NET
As has been noted, Table 1 is based on several assumptions similar to those made by Walter and Weinberg in 2002 . For example, we assumed that all liabilities of stress-tested bank holding companies would be protected, not just the liabilities representing FDIC-insured bank deposits. What would be the size of the safety net if these assumptions were changed? Contrary to our assumption about the likely protection of liabilityholders of stress-tested companies, one can imagine circumstances under which such liabilityholders might be left unprotected. If one of these companies were to fail at a time when financial markets were broadly healthy, policymakers could more easily allow the company to be handled as a bankruptcy so that no government funds are employed to protect liabilityholders (of course, the holders of FDIC-insured deposits would still be covered given that such deposits are protected regardless of the circumstances surrounding the failure). In times of general financial market strength, the failure of a large holding company could perhaps be absorbed without worries of a cascade of additional failures. And at such times, if the firm were handled through the Dodd-Frank Act's orderly liquidation process, it is possible that neither the government nor other financial firms would provide funds to protect liabilityholders.
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While investors might expect large financial firm failures to typically occur in times of widespread financial weakness, and therefore anticipate that their investments would be protected, some large firms have failed in times of financial market health. One such example was London-based Barings Bank, which failed when financial markets were broadly strong in 1995. Its failure was because of the huge trading losses generated by one unchecked Barings trader who took large, unauthorized futures positions. Given that there are circumstances under which the holders of stress-tested company liabilities might be left unprotected, dropping the assumption of their coverage and recalculating our estimate of implicitly guaranteed liabilities seems worthwhile. Large financial firms that are not bank holding companies might receive no protection in such instances, so we also drop liabilities of AIG from those liabilities with implicit backing. Also, we included in our explicitly insured deposits category those deposits covered by the FDIC's temporary guarantee programs, since these programs were in place in 2009. But under the debt guarantee program no new debt issues were covered after October 31, 2009 (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 2010b). The TAGP was set to expire as of the end of 2010, though the Dodd-Frank Act extended it to December 31, 2012. In the case of future financial firm failures, such programs may not be in place, and might not be reinstated. Therefore, re-estimating our measure of the size of the safety net without considering these deposits as protected also seems worthwhile. Table 2 contains our estimate of the size of the safety net without including the liabilities of the stress-tested bank holding companies, AIG, and the FDIC temporary insurance program deposits. These changes mean that, compared to Table 1 , the proportion of liabilities receiving explicit and implicit guarantees falls to 37.2 percent.
Additionally, while we assume that the liabilityholders of the housing and farm credit GSEs will be protected from loss, as were such holders of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac debt during the 2007-2009 financial crisis, under some circumstances such holders might be left unprotected. As in the case of the stress-tested companies, if a GSE were to fail during a period in which financial markets were healthy, policymakers might leave debtholders unprotected. Therefore, it is possible that one might want to exclude the liabilities of the GSEs from the calculation of the safety net. If the $6.8 trillion in liabilities of the GSEs were removed (which are the only implicitly guaranteed liabilities in Table 2 ), then our measure of the safety net would shrink to 21 percent of total liabilities in Table 2 , the amount of explicit liabilities shown in Table 2 .
Some readers might contend that one category of liabilities, which we have excluded from our safety net estimate, could legitimately be added: money market mutual fund liabilities. In the creation of our tables, and in Walter and Weinberg (2002) , mutual fund liabilities are excluded because the principal value of mutual fund investments, including money market mutual fund investments, can decline, without the mutual fund defaulting, if the entity in which the funds are invested defaults. As a result, these investments are akin to equity and unlike private liabilities-the focus of our estimates-which typically must pay back full principal (or else be in default). For example, an investor in a money market mutual fund, which in turn invested in financial firm commercial paper, could lose principal if the commercial paper was not repaid, but the mutual fund can continue to operate (i.e., not default).
10 This view of money market mutual fund investments as equity must be tempered, however, by events in 2008. Specifically, the Treasury stepped in and protected investors in mutual funds from losses, thereby treating investments in the funds like other guaranteed liabilities, in which losses are prevented by government assistance or guarantees. As a result, one might argue that our estimates of the fraction of total liabilities carrying a government guaranteeboth the numerator and denominator-should include money market mutual funds. If one adds the amount of such fund balances outstanding at the end of 2009 ($3.3 trillion [Investment Company Institute 2010] ) to our estimates in the column "Explicitly and Implicitly Guaranteed Liabilities" in Table 1 , the proportion would increase to 62 percent. The Table 2 figure would increase to 42 percent.
CONCLUSION
Recent government actions by legislators and financial regulators expanded the federal financial safety net. Such actions include augmentation of deposit insurance, debt guarantees for banking companies, aid to stress-tested financial firms, and, perhaps, various regulatory reform legislative proposals. As discussed in Walter and Weinberg (2002) , this expansion has likely encouraged a view that liabilityholders will be protected by the federal government in times of financial difficulty in the future. As a result of this expectation of government protection, liabilityholders will exercise less oversight over financial firm risk taking then they would without this expectation, financial firms will undertake more risk, and financial market decisions will be distorted and inefficient. mutual fund's parent typically injects funds to allow the fund to pay back full principal. This behavior by mutual fund parent companies indicates that parent companies and investors may well view money market mutual fund investments more as liabilities than equity, regardless of the fact that money market mutual funds can break the buck without defaulting. Banking and Savings Firms-Implicitly Guaranteed Liabilities:
Total liabilities of the 19 stress-tested institutions found in theY9C (quarterly bank holding company financial reports), less 1) the explicitly guaranteed deposits of the banks and savings institutions owned by these 19 firms, and 2) the FDIC-insured debt (insured under the DGP) of each of these institutions. The estimated FDIC-insured deposits and the guaranteed amount in noninterest-bearing transaction accounts for each bank can be found on the FDIC's website in the "Institution Directory" (www2.fdic.gov/idasp). The amount of DGP debt of each firm can be found on the firms' 10Ks. Credit Unions-Explicitly Guaranteed Liabilities:
Total insured shares at the $250,000 limit (National Credit Union Administration 2009).
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Board of Governors (2010) 
